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Tom W. Smith, The 75% Solution: An Analysis of the Structure of Attitudes on Gun Control, 1959 -1977 , 71 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 300 (1980 The stable level of gun control opposition is also notable in light of the changing importance of the gun control issue itself. After a flurry of activity on the issue of firearms regulation in the mid-to-late 1930s, gun control ceased being a topic of public interest until 1957 when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue proposed certain changes in the administration of the Federal Firearms Act of 1938. During this time, discussions concerning the protection of domestic manufacturers from imports and inquiries into the availability of firearms to juveniles (the Dodd Investigations) rendered gun control a minor topic of concern. Not until the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963 did gun control become a major issue. A count of magazine articles dealing with gun control from 1935 to 1977 indicates that coverage was nonexistent from 1941-43 through 1953-55. The proposed tightening of the administration of the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 created a small swell of attention cresting at five articles in 1957-59. The rate then fell to an average of one article per year from 1959-61 through 1962-63, before surging to twelve articles per year over the next four years (1963-64 to 1966-67) . Interest climbed sharply over the next two years and peaked at forty-seven articles in 1968-69: the time of the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968. Subsequent coverage remained stable at about ten articles per year until 1975-77 when legislative activity on handgun control pushed coverage to about thirty articles per year. 1935-37-0 1963-65-21 1937-39-1 1965-66-13 1939-41-3 1966-67-14 1941-43-0 1967-68-20 1943-45-0 1968-69-47 In order to explore this pattern of stability and gain insight into the factors that help to form opinions on gun control, this article conducts analyses of 1) the socio-demographic associates of gun control, 2) the relationship between attitudes toward crime and punishment and gun control, and 3) the interrelationship between various gun control attitudes.
STRUCTURE OF A TTITUDES ON GUN CONTROL
Data were available in the Social Change files at the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) for cross-tabular analysis of twelve of the sixteen surveys used in table 1 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, 1945 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -47-0 1947 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -49-0 1949 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -51-0 1951 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -53-0 1953 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -55-0 1955 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -57-2 1957 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -59-5 1959 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -61-3 1961 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -63-1 1969 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -70-11 1970 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -71-7 1971 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -72-10 1972 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -73-14 1973 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -74-9 1974 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -75-10 1975 (AIPO 616, 681, 704, 733, -76-30 1976 For a good account of the history of gun control legislation, 749, 838, GSS 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77) . The variables available for analysis over time included sex, age, race, community type, region, religion, education, income, party identification, and gun ownership.
To examine the relationships between time, the background variables, and gun control, d-systems were employed.
3 The variables are cross-tabulated and differences in percentages between categories are calculated. Table 2 , for example, shows the percent opposing gun control on each available survey broken down by sex of respondent. The d-system inspects the difference between men and women and tests for its statistical significance. It also tests whether the sex difference is constant over all data points, or whether the sex difference interacts with time.
Three models are used to explain the differences. If the observed differences are not statistically significant, then the model hypothesizing that there are no differences between the categories (d=0) is accepted. If the observed differences are statistically significant, then the pooled difference is cal- culated. If the observed differences do not vary significantly from the pooled estimate, then the model that the differences are constant (d=c) is accepted. If the differences do vary significantly from the pooled estimate, then differences exist between the groups, but their magnitude varies with time. This outcome is described as nonconstant. For example, table 2 shows that the differences between men and women are statistically significant (x 2 = 711.6 and probability is less than .001). The variation of the observed differences in each survey is not significantly different from the pooled or average difference (x 2 = 13.7 and probability equals .252). As a result, the constant hypothesis (d=c) is accepted in this case. Davis ed. 1976) . In brief, the first hypothesis tested is that the sample proportions are from a constant universe value, which is estimated to be the pooled average of the proportions. The criterion for the goodness-of-fit is the chi-square statistic that divides the squared deviation of the observed value from the predicted value by the variance of the observed value. This is referred to as the "test for homogeneity." The next hypothesis tested is that the sample proportions are from a linear universe trend. The chi-square goodness-of-fit test is used to compare the actual proportions with their linear estimates. This is referred to as the "test for linearity." Table 2 examines the relationship between sex and attitudes toward gun control. The data show that women consistently have been less opposed to the requiring of a police permit for gun possession than men. The pooled difference over twelve surveys from 1959 to 1975 indicates that women are 16.8 percentage points less opposed than men. The stronger desire of women to control firearms reflects differences in the socialization process of boys and girls. Traditional female upbringing includes, in general, such values as pacificism, sympathy, and passivity and leads to a greater opposition to war, capital punishment, 5 and, in particular, a disinterest in firearms. An analysis of the cohort differences reveals no relation between age and gun control over the period. This result indicates that the stable level of opposition observed may extend back into time because birth cohorts do not vary on this issue. The relationship between race and gun control varies considerably over time. significant correlation at the remaining seven times. Overall there is no discernible trend. On all but the first survey, however, the direction is toward less opposition among blacks, with a pooled difference of -7.2 percentage points. It therefore appears that blacks tend to be less opposed than whites to gun control. The next factors analyzed were ecological features. Table 4 demonstrates a strong relationship between community type and the regulation of firearms. As one moves from the countryside, through the small towns, and on to the metropolitan centers, oppositionto gun control steadily falls. In rural America opposition has averaged about one-third. In towns the opposition is 7.4 percentage points lower than in the rural areas, in medium metropolitan areas 12.6 percentage points lower, and in large centers 18.3 percentage points lower. This association was examined more closely through the use of a refined measurement of community type. The community classification distinguishes suburban from central city and exurbia from rural. Table 5 indicates that there may be some differences between the cities and the suburbs on this issue. In large metropolitan areas opposition grows as one moves from the center to the inner and outer periphery. In medium-sized areas exurbia clearly differentiates itself from the central city, but the inner suburbs show the most opposition. This pattern does not result from the suburban character of exurbia but rather from the fact that much of this area is rural rather than suburban in character. In brief, community types differentiate on this issue with the main split being rural/metropolitan and with smaller suburban/core differences.
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS
The next ecological variable, region, also has a strong relationship to gun control. Table 6 indicates that the Northeast is 16.8 percentage points less opposed than the South and West and 12.9 percentage points less opposed than the Midwest. The division is therefore not the classic South/nonSouth division but rather a division along a Northeast/non-Northeast axis.
Given the strong association between gun control attitudes and both community type and region, it was decided to control for this interaction. Both the community and regional relationships exhibit independence, demonstrating that the gun control issue is a function not only of one's community, but also of the corhmunity's regional location. Opposition is higher in rural communities within rural regions (see table 7) :
Two stratification variables, education and in- a On AIPO LT2500 includes rural areas and places under 2500 outside the urbanized area of standard metropolitan statistical areas. Towns are over 2500 and under 50,000 and outside of urbanized areas. Medium cities are central cities from 50,000 to 249,999 plus suburbs within the urbanized area. Large cities are 250,000 and over plus suburbs. On GSS incorporated suburbs are coded with their central cities and unincorporated suburbs are coded into the LT2500 code. This gives rough, but imperfect comparison between the coding schemes.
* Not statistically significant at .05 when adjusted for multistage sampling.
come, were tested, but both showed no relationship to attitudes on gun control. 7 This situation, which has not changed over time, indicates that when a person considers the need for the regulation of firearms, the social standing of the individual does not influence the decision.
7 Tabular data are available from author.
Several affiliational characteristics were considered, the first one being religion. Protestants and those without a religious affiliation have been 12.5 percentage points more opposed to gun control than Catholics and 23.7 percentage points more opposed than Jews. (See table 8 ).
In one sense these results are surprising since the regulation of firearms has never been a doctrinal [Vol. 71 middle stock consists of groups that either arrived by the mid-nineteenth century and/or settled in rural areas. The new group is generally late nineteenth or early twentieth century arrivals. The white, mixed group consists of people with multiple national backgrounds unable to specify one dominant origin. Finally, blacks are separated because, although they were early and rural immigrants, they were not part of the host culture and were restricted in their use of firearms. The table shows that the old stock white and mixed groups are most opposed to gun control, followed by the middle stock (-4.4%), blacks (-9.4%) and the new stock (-16.2%).
1980]
One behavioral characteristic, gun ownership, was tested, and it showed a strong relationship to attitudes on gun control. As might be expected, gun owners are more hostile than non-owners to the idea of requiring police permits for guns. This difference in opposition between owners and nonowners has been consistent over time and averages 22.4 percentage points. The strength of the relationship between ownership and attitudes toward gun control reflects the similarly strong association between owning guns and community type characteristics. Thus, individuals who own guns tend to be male, white, Protestant, old stock, rural, and non-Northeastern. Based on a separate analysis of ethnic origins and generations of residence in the United States, the following division of national origins was made according to the time, place, and circumstances of immigration. Old stock are English, Scottish, Scotch-Irish, Canadian, French, "American," Amerindian, and people unable to give a country of origin. Middle stock are Scandanavian, German, Dutch, Swiss, Austrian, and Irish. New Stock are all other nonblacks who gave a national origin, mainly Southern and Eastern Europeans, Hispanics, and Orientals. White, Mixed are those unable to choose a primary national origin from several named origins.
* Not statistically significant when adjusted for multistage sampling.
ATTITUDES TOWARD CRIME AND PUNISHMENT AS

RELATED TO GUN CONTROL
Violent crime has increased dramatically over the last two decades. Despite the concomitant increase in both punitiveness and concern for personal safety, 8 the level of opposition to gun control has remained constant. To examine this apparent anomaly, attitudes toward gun control were compared to a measure of personal concern about crime ("Is there any area right around here-that is, within a .mile-where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?") and to two measures of crease in crime has created another force countering the attitudes connected with fear. Aggregate level data on guns in the domestic civilian market indicate a rise in the number of guns over the last two decades, although surveys fail to confirm this trend? Assuming the accuracy of the aggregate figures, this expansion of gun ownership would tend to increase opposition to gun controls (given the strong relationship between gun ownership and opposition). This increase in gun production (with an accompanying increase in the market share for handguns) could be viewed as a punitive response to crime like capital punishment and strict courts, but unlike capital punishment and tough courts, this punitive response is strongly related to gun control attitudes and would tend to lower support for gun control. The preceding analyses of the socio-demographic and crime/punishment structure of attitudes toward gun control suggest that such attitudes are influenced by 1) gender (since it is a sex-specific culture) and exposure to a gun culture, 2) current residence, and 3) gun ownership and fear of crime. Traditionally, residents of rural and frontier areas have been heavy users of guns for recreational and protective purposes. The ownership and use of guns was a typical part of the socialization and behavioral pattern of males. Residence in rural localities and regions provides continuing exposure to this traditional gun culture, which currently centers around hunting, and therefore gun ownership is Figure 1 (p. 309) graphs the relationships beprevalent among groups partaking in this culture tween these variables and gun control. shows that each variable affects gun control directly. Members of the non-gun culture (everyone except the old stock) are less opposed to gun control than members of the gun culture independent of area of residence, fear, ownership and sex (-6.1% ). This group is also less opposed because its members own fewer guns (-13.7* 14.5 = -2.0) and reside in non-rural localities and Northeast states (-17.5* 1.4 --0.2 and -20.8*9.2 = -1.9). Furthermore, members of the non-gun culture are less opposed to gun control because they live in areas engendering more fear and having fewer guns (-17.5*16.5*4.6 = -0.1, -20.8*5.0*4.6 = -. 05 and -17.5*19.2*14.5 = 0.5, -20.8*20.5*14.5 = 0.6). Women are less opposed than men because of their sex net of other variables (-7.7%), because of their greater fear (38.6*4.6 = -1.8), and because of their owning fewer guns (-13.7*14.5 = -2.0). The model also exhibits the expected positive relationships between opposition to gun control and residence in rural communities and non-Northeast regions. Place of residence exerts an influence on gun control attitudes, both directly, and through associated levels of fear and gun ownership, which in their turn relate independently to the level of gun control opposition.
This analysis shows that each variable affects gun control attitudes directly." Although level of gun-culture exposure and area of residence both " In one case, however, the direct relationship almost disappears. Rural residence has only a small (1.4%) direct relationship left and its indirect impact via gun ownership is twice as strong (2.8%).
affect attitudes toward gun control through the corresponding level of weapons ownership, these cultural and environmental influences also independently affect gun control attitudes. Thus, people in groups having high ownership levels and socially sanctioning the use of guns are influenced by this culture and are more opposed to gun control even if they do not personally own guns.
INTERRELATION OF GUN CONTROL ATTITUDES
In addition to being a function of the sociodemographic factors discussed above, opposition to gun control also varies according to the severity of the control proposed and the type of weapon specified. Table 11 presents the responses to eighteen questions on gun control, most of which are analyzable along two dimensions: first, the types of weapon-handgun, longgun, or both, and second, the type of restriction proposed-new purchase permits, registration of new and old guns, banning of gun, and miscellaneous controls (see table 13 ).
While opposition to purchase permits and registrations of all types of guns ranged from 25-30%, 83% of the sample opposed confiscation of all guns. Similarly, whereas only 20% oppose registration of handguns, 32% oppose "registration and strict control," 53% oppose banning handguns in high crime areas, and 61% oppose a nationwide ban. Opposition is also greater when the control scheme specifies longguns or all guns as opposed to handguns. While 48% of the sampling believe that longgun laws are either appropriate or too strict, only 28% hold the same beliefs with respect to handgun laws. Likewise, whereas 83% oppose confiscation of all guns and 30% oppose an all-guns registration requirement, only 60% oppose banning handguns and 20% oppose requiring their registration. Admittedly, these observations are tenuous because they are based partially on comparisons between surveys conducted at different times worded and variantly across types of weapons.
It was possible, however, to examine how attitudes toward four types of gun control scaled together on a 1976 NORO survey. Table 12 shows a Guttman scaling of attitudes toward a police permit, registration of guns (see table 12-B), a handgun ban (see table 11-q3, and confiscation of all guns (see table 12-Q). The four items scale moderately well, but there are some obvious exceptions. The largest is between people opposing police permits but favoring gun registration (6.7%). This group is almost as large as those supporting permits and opposing registration (7.9%), and if this item is scored as the easiest gun control item the four items scale almost as well (see table 14). Police permit and registration thus have about the same degree of difficulty (79.6% either approve or disPolice Permit approve of both items). If the scale is reduced to three items with either police permits or gun registration as the easiest gun control item, their scalability goes up appreciably (.149 and .142 respectively) . Each of the other three large off-scale groups favors banning pistols and opposes confiscation as well as either the police permit, registration or both. This clustering indicates that gun control is not strictly unidimensional, but that reference to handguns rather than all guns makes a difference. In sum, the scaling of these four items supports the notion that attitudes toward gun control vary according to the severity of the restriction and type of weapon specified.
Next, time trends were inspected for the gun control items in table 12. Five time trends (excluding the pre-1959 points and series of one year or less) are shown in Figure 2 . Attitudes toward an ammunition permit, registration of purchases, and gun control for youths show a constant trend similar to the trend in attitude toward the standard police permit. Two series, however, show linear increases in opposition. One, dealing with the legality of keeping loaded weapons, reflects attitudes toward what is clearly a side issue. Furthermore, opposition to a police permit. An examination of to form attitudes on gun control, the analysis above the association between these two series across time suggests why the level of support for police permits revealed a strong and constant relationship has remained stable over time. First, since gun (d=.354). The growing opposition to a handgun control attitudes are unrelated to cohort and eduban came equally from both those for and those cation, the succession of cohorts and the resulting against police permits. It seems that attitudes tochanging educational distribution have been inward a handgun ban, unlike those toward the consequential. Conversely, those variables which police permit, were influenced by the crime and do relate to gun control attitudes have done so punishment trends. As the violent crime rate inconstantly and have had little or no marginal shifts creased, people apparently became convinced that over the last two decades. As a result they have not forbidding the private use of pistols was an inappropriate response. This interpretation is supported 12 A. STINCHOMBE et al., supra note 8. by data on the increasing share of gunowners '2 Interaction significant at .007 but not significant having a pistol and on the increasing proportion of when adjusted for clustering.
promoted changes in gun control attitudes. Second, the analysis indicates that gun control attitudes stem in large part from a cultural heritage that is not likely to be drastically altered by contemporary events. Third, the potentially strong impact on gun control attitudes resulting from the major changes in the crime and punishment area has not materialized because gun control is not viewed as a punitive response to crime and because the tendency to support control caused by increased fear may be countered by increased production of guns in general and more pistols in particular. The exception that may help to prove the rule is the growth in opposition to a pistol ban, a trend associated with growing punitiveness. In brief, it appears that attitudes toward police permits will not change so long as they remain unaffected by attitudes such as those toward crime and punishment. If, however, attitudes toward gun control do become associated with developments in crime and punishment or with some emerging trend (possibly a growing concern about government regulation), then it is unlikely that these attitudes will remain stable. Until evidence of such a change is found, however, support for the police permit is expected to remain near the 75% level. 
